THE ANONYMOUS POSTER:
HOW TO PROTECT INTERNET USERS’
PRIVACY AND PREVENT ABUSE
SCOTT NESS 1

ABSTRACT
The threat of anonymous Internet posting to individual privacy
has been met with congressional and judicial indecisiveness. Part
of the problem stems from the inherent conflict between punishing
those who disrespect one’s privacy by placing a burden on the
individual websites and continuing to support the Internet’s
development. Additionally, assigning traditional tort liability is
problematic as the defendant enjoys an expectation of privacy as
well, creating difficulty in securing the necessary information to
proceed with legal action. One solution to resolving invasion of
privacy disputes involves a uniform identification verification
program that ensures user confidentiality while promoting
accountability for malicious behavior.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
The right to privacy is not derived from any single source. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes that “[no] one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his [honor] and reputation.” 2
Europeans have long adhered to a similar agreement, which promotes
individual privacy. 3
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2
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR], available at
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/(“[Everyone] has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”). The General
Assembly adopted the UDHR as a “common standard” for recognizing the
“equal and inalienable” rights of all humans, “the foundation of freedom, justice
and peace in the world.” Id.
3
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 8(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3,
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¶2
More recently, the right to privacy is protected by the Privacy Act
of 1974. 4 The United States Constitution does not explicitly mention a right
to privacy; the Supreme Court, however, has found a right to privacy
implicit within the First, Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 5

The right to privacy in the U.S. traces its roots to an 1890 article
written by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis.6 In that article,
Warren and Brandeis outlined a basis for receiving compensation from the
tort of invasion of privacy. 7 Within the spectrum of invasion of privacy are
three subcategories particularly relevant when confronting Internet
exposure. First, public disclosure of private facts constitutes a tort if both
parties believe that the embarrassing matter is true and the plaintiff’s injury
resulted from that assumption.8 Second, publicly publishing a matter
concerning another individual in a false light implicates invasion of privacy
tort liability. 9 Finally, an invasion of privacy claim is available in cases
where a plaintiff’s name or likeness is appropriated for the benefit of
another. 10
¶3

¶4
The threat of technological advances to individual privacy has been
met with congressional indecisiveness. Congressional action to impede
digital invasions of privacy—like the Electronic Communications Privacy

1953) (“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.”), available at http://www.pfc.org.uk/node/328.
4
5 U.S.C. 552a(b) (1974) (“No agency shall disclose any record which is
contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person,
or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior
written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains.”).
5
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (citations omitted)
(“[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. . . . [America has] had many
controversies over these penumbral rights of ‘privacy and repose.’ These cases
bear witness that the right of privacy which presses for recognition here is a
legitimate one.”).
6
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
7
Id. at 213 (“If the invasion of privacy constitutes a legal injuria, the elements
for demanding redress exist, since already the value of mental suffering, caused
by an act wrongful in itself, is recognized as a basis for compensation.”).
8
DAVID A. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS § 3:1 (2009).
9
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977). Plaintiffs seeking
damages for false light invasion of privacy claims must also show that the false
light in which the defendant cast the plaintiff would be “highly offensive to a
reasonable person,” and that the defendant had knowledge of or acted in reckless
disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter. Id.
10
Id. § 652C.
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Act (ECPA) 11—has been stymied by its conflicting goal of supporting the
Internet’s development. Indeed, this goal is featured prominently in the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA),12 in which Congress
recognized that “the United States [should] promote the continued
development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and
other interactive media.”13 Fueled by this desire to empower web-based
companies, Congress included a “Good Samaritan” clause in the CDA. The
clause absolves interactive service providers of civil publisher or speaker
liability so long as the service provider acts in good faith to restrict access to
damaging material.14
One of the most prominent characteristics of the internet is
anonymity. Anonymous posting is now in vogue, with the advent of College
Anonymous Confession Board (CollegeACB). 15 CollegeACB intends to
“[help] build community and [engender] the open exchange of
information.” 16 The site, however, is the successor to the notorious
JuicyCampus, 17 a website that reveled in salacious posts.18 JuicyCampus’s
scandalous posts dried up after students “spammed” the site with random
book excerpts, biblical quotes, and poetry verses.19 The lack of participation
by the courts in JuicyCampus’s shutdown demonstrated judicial
unwillingness to act against Internet entities, even when violations of
privacy rights were blatant.20
¶5

11

18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2006). Section 2511 establishes criminal liability for
one who “intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other
person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic
communication.”
12
Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56,
133–43 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
13
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1) (2006).
14
Id. § 230(c).
15
College Anonymous Confession Board Home Page,
http://www.collegeacb.com/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2010)
16
CollegeACB,. Press Release. (Feb. 5, 2009), available at
http://collegeacb.blogspot.com/2009/02/collegeacb-press-release.html (last
visited Mar, 31, 2010).
17
JuicyCampus, http://juicycampus.blogspot.com/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
18
Id. See also Jeffrey R. Young, JuicyCampus Shuts Down, Blaming the
Economy, Not the Controversy, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (D.C.), Feb. 5, 2009,
http://chronicle.com/article/JuicyCampus-Shuts-Down-Bla/1506/ (explaining
that the site openly encouraged salacious postings through its motto “Keep it
Juicy”).
19
Jessica Bell, Students ‘Spam’ JuicyCampus, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN, Oct. 31,
2008, http://thedp.com/node/57393.
20
See discussion infra ¶¶ 29-30 for a more in-depth discussion of the
JuicyCampus case.
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¶6
Part I of this iBrief describes the tort of invasion of privacy, its
formulation and the elements required to plead a viable claim. Part II
evaluates the ECPA and its application within the Internet context. Part III
discusses the goals of the CDA and the legislative history behind the act and
the controversial “Good Samaritan” provision. Part IV considers the privacy
issues associated with Internet anonymity.
¶7
Part V examines how, while courts are mindful of the disintegrating
privacy boundaries in cyberspace, they nevertheless refuse to allow actions
against the sites that encourage such behavior because they continue to
abide by the principles set forth in the CDA and strive to promote the
perpetual growth of the Internet. 21 On the other hand, courts have imposed
injunctions against sites where the entity’s positive contributions to Internet
usage cannot outweigh the negative goal the site furthers and the resultant
public outcry for harsh action, such as Napster. 22
¶8
Faced with this disheartening judicial inconsistency, Part VI
describes one possible solution: a uniform identification verification
program similar to VeriSign, but with statutorily mandated confidentiality
that can only be abrogated after meeting a high burden of proof of harm.
Such a program would guard free speech, promote accountability for
malicious actions of bloggers and anonymous posters, and still permit
websites to operate and innovate.

I. THE TORT OF INVASION OF PRIVACY
¶9
The tort of invasion of privacy finds its origins in Samuel Warren
and Louis Brandeis’s “The Right to Privacy,” in which the authors
recognized that an individual should have full protection in person and
property. 23 Known as the “inviolate personality,” this concept has existed
as long as the Common Law. 24
¶10
At the turn of the twentieth century, “instantaneous photograph and
newspaper [enterprises]” thrived on sensationalism; they repeatedly
demonstrated a lack of consideration for “the obvious bounds of propriety
and of decency.” 25 Thus, it became necessary for individuals to find “some
retreat from the world.” 26 The remedies for such a violation would likely be

21

See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
23
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 6, at 205.
24
Id. at 193.
25
Id. at 195–96; see also ELDER, supra note 8, at § 1:1 (expanding on Warren
and Brandeis’s discussion of the “yellow-journalism” press’s willingness to
dismiss individual privacy).
26
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 6, at 196.
22
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damages or an injunction, though the latter’s applicability would be very
limited.27
¶11
Following the Warren and Brandeis article, the legal community
took notice of tort liability involving privacy issues. In 1960, William
Prosser conceived the modern framework for privacy torts and articulated
four categories under which a claim could be brought: intrusion upon
seclusion, public disclosure, false light, and appropriation.28 For the purpose
of evaluating Internet claims, this iBrief only concerns itself with public
disclosure, false light, and appropriation.
¶12
Under the Prosserian model, a public disclosure entails “publicity to
a matter concerning the private life of another, if the matter publicized is of
a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is
not of legitimate concern to the public.” 29 It is not sufficient to disclose
private information to a single individual or a small group of people.30 In
cases where all parties believed the revealed material to be true at the time
of the disclosure and subsequent injury resulted from an assumption of
truthfulness, a later discovery that the information was inaccurate does not
preclude the disclosure action. 31
¶13
Under the standards outlined by the American Law Institute, a
defendant who publicizes a matter concerning another that places the other
in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy,
if the false light in which the other was placed would be offensive to a
reasonable person.32 False light claims require that “the actor had
knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the
publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.”33
The reasonable person standard regarding offensiveness is crucial in these
cases as inaccurate statements, though undesirable, are commonplace. 34

27

Id. at 219.
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). These types of
invasions were to be viewed as distinct as they “may be subject, in some
respects at least, to different rules; and that when what is said as to any one of
them is carried over to another, it may not be at all applicable, and confusion
may follow.” Id. The American Law Institute incorporated the Prosser
framework into the Second Restatement in 1979. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
29
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
30
Id.
31
ELDER, supra note 8, § 3:1.
32
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
33
Id.
34
See id. cmt. c (“Complete and perfect accuracy in published reports
concerning any individual is seldom attainable by any reasonable effort, and
most minor errors, such as a wrong address for his home, or a mistake in the
28
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Though false light and defamation claims are quite similar, the conduct
actionable under this claim is not necessarily defamatory in nature, and
courts finding a false statement or impression not defamatory are not
precluded from imposing liability for false light.35
Finally, an invasion of privacy claim is available against one who
appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another. 36
This form of invasion of privacy is commonly claimed when the defendant
uses the plaintiff’s identity to promote a business or product.37 It is not
enough that the defendant uses the plaintiff’s name or identity as the
defendant must adopt it for its potential benefit or value. 38
¶14

II. THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)39 contains the
Wiretap Act 40 and the Stored Communications Act. 41 Title I of the ECPA
amends the Federal Wiretap Act,42 addressing the problem of unwanted
interception of wire, oral and electronic communications. 43 Title II, the
Stored Communications Act, focuses on the security of stored
communication from dissemination or review. 44
¶15

¶16
The ECPA regulates the circumstances under which electronic
communications may be reviewed by third parties, including Internet
service providers (ISPs). Under the ECPA, it is illegal to intercept or
procure any electronic communications, unless various exceptions apply.45
Such exceptions include (1) service of a court order; 46 (2) the content of the

date when he entered his employment or similar unimportant details of his
career, would not in the absence of special circumstances give any serious
offense to a reasonable person. The plaintiff’s privacy is not invaded when the
unimportant false statements are made, even when they are made deliberately.”).
35
ELDER, supra note 8, § 4:1.
36
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
37
Id. § 652C, cmt. b.
38
Id. § 652C, cmt. c (explaining that the defendant must have also appropriated
the plaintiff’s reputation, prestige, social standing or other public interest).
39
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2006).
40
Id.
41
Id. §§ 2701–2712. The Stored Communications Act is the ECPA section most
applicable in Internet privacy litigation.
42
18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq.
43
S. REP. NO. 99-341, at 1–3 (1986).
44
Id. at 3.
45
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a). “Electronic communications” include “any transfer of
signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic
or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce.” § 2510(12).
46
Id. § 2511(2)(a)(ii)(A).
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electronic communication is readily accessible to the general public;47 or (3)
the communication is inadvertently obtained by the service provider, and its
content pertained to criminal activity and is made available to law
enforcement officials. 48
The Stored Communications Act provides that it is illegal to obtain,
alter, or otherwise interfere with authorized access to a wire or electronic
communication while it is in electronic storage by intentionally accessing
without authorization, or exceeding one’s authorized access to, a facility
through which an electronic communication service is provided.49 The
provisions within the Stored Communications Act do not apply in cases
where the conduct in question was authorized by the person or entity
providing the wire or electronic communications service, or alternatively by
a user of that service with respect to a communication of or intended by that
user. 50
¶17

¶18
In one of the early Internet privacy cases to employ the ECPA, a
group of internet users mounted a class action against DoubleClick, Inc. 51
The plaintiffs claimed that DoubleClick, an Internet advertising service, had
inserted cookies 52 on users’ computers and collected private information,
including names, e-mail addresses, home and business addresses, telephone
numbers, individual’s Internet history including prior web searches and sites
visited, and other communication and additional data that Internet users
would not ordinarily expect advertisers to be able to collect.53 The plaintiffs
asserted that the placement of cookies on their hard drives constituted an
unauthorized access and, as a result, violated Title II of the ECPA.54
¶19
The Court rejected the ECPA claim, noting that the cookies were
not intended to be temporary, and therefore did not fall within the statutory

47

Id. § 2511(2)(g)(i).
Id. § 2511(3)(b)(4).
49
Id.§ 2701(a) (2006).
50
Id. § 2701(c).
51
In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 500
(S.D.N.Y. 2001). The plaintiffs claimed that DoubleClick had violated the
ECPA as well as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030, et seq.,
and raised several New York state common laws claims, including invasion of
privacy, unjust enrichment, and trespass to property. Id.
52
“Cookies” are defined in this case as “computer programs commonly used by
Web sites to store useful information such as usernames, passwords, and
preferences, making it easier for users to access Web pages in an efficient
manner.” Id. at 502–03.
53
Id. at 503.
54
DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 507.
48
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framework of Title II. 55 Furthermore, even if the cookies and their
identification numbers were electronic communications in electronic
storage, DoubleClick’s access was still authorized as Title II exempted
conduct, which was authorized by a user of the service with respect to a
communication of or intended for that user. 56 The court concluded that the
cookies’ identification numbers were in fact internal DoubleClick
Communications, “of” and “intended for” the company. 57
¶20
The technical complexities involved in DoubleClick illuminate the
challenges faced by courts applying existing law to cyberspace. Here, the
DoubleClick court is quite competent in articulating Internet structure and
programming. 58 However, Tasker and Pakcyk suggest that attorneys and
judges do not necessarily possess the proper insight into the legal
ramifications related to computer programming and processes. 59 For this
reason, the effectiveness of the ECPA remains in doubt.

III. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT OF 1996
¶21
Congress formulated the CDA to expand upon the nation’s policy
of promoting the continued development of the Internet, 60 and maintaining
the “vibrant and competitive free market” for web-based products and
services. 61

55

Id. at 512 (“Title II only protects electronic communications stored ‘for a
limited time’ in the ‘middle’ of a transmission, i.e. when an electronic
communication service temporarily stores a communication while waiting to
deliver it.”)
56
Id. at 513; see 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(2).
57
DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 513 (“DoubleClick creates the cookies,
assigns them identification numbers, and places them on plaintiffs' hard drives.
The cookies and their identification numbers are vital to DoubleClick and
meaningless to anyone else. In contrast, virtually all plaintiffs are unaware that
the cookies exist, that these cookies have identification numbers, that
DoubleClick accesses these identification numbers and that these numbers are
critical to DoubleClick's operations.”).
58
See id. at 503–05 (explaining how DoubleClick targets banner advertisements
and utilizes cookies to collect user information); see also Ty Tasker & Daryn
Pakcyk, Cyber-surfing on the High Seas of Legalese: Law and Technology of
Internet Agreements, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 79, 82 n.11 (2008) (crediting the
DoubleClick decision as “one such rare instance of an informative and insightful
court decision explaining Internet structure and programming”).
59
Tasker & Pakcyk, supra note 58, at 82 (noting that “attorneys who draft
Internet agreements should understand the technical design and functioning of a
particular web site to ensure that the provisions are drafted to cover the site's
characteristics”).
60
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1).
61
Id. § 230(b)(2).
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¶22
Under this “Good Samaritan” clause,”[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any information provided by another information content provider.” 62 The
CDA explicitly stated that:

[N]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of any action voluntarily taken in good faith to
restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected. 63

Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3), the CDA preempts any state or local law
contrary to the “Good Samaritan” provision.64
In the first post-CDA decision, Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,65 an
anonymous poster placed a message on an America Online (“AOL”)
message board advertising T-shirts for sale. 66 The posting advertised
“Naughty Oklahoma T-Shirts,” promoting shirts featuring “offensive and
tasteless slogans” related to the 1995 bombing of the Oklahoma City federal
building. 67 Patrons interested in purchasing the shirts were to call “‘Ken’ at
Zeran’s home phone number in Seattle.” 68 As a result of this posting, Zeran
received many calls “comprised primarily of angry and derogatory
messages, but also including death threats.”69 Zeran was not connected with
the shirts or the ads, and AOL assured him that the post would be
removed. 70
¶23

In his suit, Zeran alleged negligence against AOL, 71 claiming that
because he had alerted AOL to the hoax posting, “AOL had a duty to
remove the defamatory posting promptly, to notify its subscribers of the
message's false nature, and to effectively screen future defamatory

¶24

62

47 U.S.C.§ 230(c)(1). An “interactive computer service” includes “any
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables
computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a
service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated
or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.” Id. § 230(f)(2).
63
Id. § 230(c)(2)(a).
64
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (“No cause of action may be brought and no liability
may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this
section.”).
65
129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
66
Id. at 329.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 328.
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material.”72 The Fourth Circuit rejected Zeran’s purported negligence claim
because his pleading closely resembled a defamation action.73 In analyzing
the case as a defamation claim, the court cited the CDA and explained that
section 230 created immunity against any action seeking to impose ISP
liability for a third-party posting. 74 Thus, the court recognized AOL’s
defense and affirmed the District Court’s granting of AOL’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings.75
¶25
While many post-CDA decisions have involved defamation claims,
courts have applied CDA immunity to defendants in invasion of privacy
cases. In Parker v. Google, Inc., the plaintiff, an Internet publisher, claimed
that his copyrighted work “29 Reasons Not to be a Nice Guy” had been
partially copied and posted on the USENET without his permission. 76 The
USENET is a global system of online bulletin boards wherein users can
read, search and post messages, of which Google purchased an archive in
2000. 77 Parker asserted that Google invaded his privacy by creating an
unauthorized biography of him whenever someone “Googled” his name into
the search engine. 78 Furthermore, the complaint alleged that Google had
been negligent as it continued to archive a website containing negative,
defamatory statements even after Parker notified the site.79 The District
Court dismissed Parker’s claims, including invasion of privacy, The Third
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss Parker’s
complaint. 80
¶26
The question of whether the CDA applies to the whole spectrum of
Prosserian invasion of privacy subcategories was addressed in Doe v.
Friendfinder Network, Inc. 81 There, the plaintiff maintained that a profile
containing a nude photo and a purported description of her proclivities was
posted on the AdultFriendFinder.com online community website.82 The
72

Id. at 330.
Id. at 332 (“Although Zeran attempts to artfully plead his claims as ones of
negligence, they are indistinguishable from a garden variety defamation
action.”)
74
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (Section 230 “precludes courts from entertaining
claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher's role. Thus,
lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher's
traditional editorial functions-such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw,
postpone or alter content-are barred.”).
75
Id. at 328–30.
76
242 Fed. App’x 833, 835 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
77
Id.
78
Id. at 838.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 840.
81
540 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.H. 2008).
82
Id. at 292.
73
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Plaintiff sued the website for invasion of privacy, which she characterized
as an infringement of her intellectual property rights. 83 Despite the
defendant’s attempts to take “special pains” to ensure posters’ anonymity on
the site, the profile photo nevertheless “reasonably identified” the
plaintiff. 84
¶27
The district court observed that CDA protections do not affect
claims arising out of intellectual property law. 85 The defendant contended
that allowing state-law intellectual property claims to survive CDA
immunity would have a devastating impact on the Internet, as protecting
individual intellectual property rights would be a cost of doing business
online. 86 The court compromised with the defendants, reasoning that while
the intellectual property exemption to CDA immunity has been established
for misappropriation, commonly considered a “right of publicity” claim, 87
“[§230] applies with full force to the other invasion of privacy claims
asserted in her complaint.” 88
¶28
The court found that the plaintiff demonstrated a sustainable claim
for infringement of the right to publicity because the defendants used
identifiable aspects of her persona in advertisements on other websites in
order to increase the profitability of their site. 89 Thus, the court allowed the
plaintiff to pursue the misappropriation claim, even though it dismissed the
claims under the other Prosserian prongs of invasion of privacy. 90

IV. THE ANONYMOUS INTERNET USER
¶29
The desire to publish anonymously predates the Internet, as
anonymous authors enjoy the freedom to express themselves without fear of
negative backlash. The Federalist Papers, for example, were published using
pseudonyms. 91 Modern anonymous works, like those at issue in Talley v.
California, continue to be protected by the courts. In that case, the Supreme
Court voided a Los Angeles city ordinance forbidding the distribution of
any handbill if it did not contain the name and address of its creator and its
sponsor. 92 Such an identification requirement restricted the freedom to
83

Friendfinder, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 298.
Id.
85
Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed
to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.”)).
86
Id. at 301–02.
87
Id. at 302 (quoting Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th
Cir. 2006) (“[T]he right of publicity is [an] intellectual property right.”)).
88
Id. at 303.
89
Id. at 304.
90
See id. at 303.
91
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960).
92
Id.
84
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distribute information and thereby freedom of expression.93 “Liberty of
circulating is as essential to that freedom as liberty of publishing; indeed,
without the circulation, the publication would be of little value.” 94
¶30
Many websites promote anonymity as a way for Internet users to
have their voice on the web. Blogger, a site that facilitates independent blog
creation, allows users to “[organize] the world’s information from the
personal perspective.” 95 On Blogger, creators can design customized blogs
on a limitless array of topics. The system, now owned by Google, 96
provides its customers with a free, user-friendly interface with which one
can create a customized blog, discussing any topic the user desires.97
¶31
Though Blogger promotes communication and free expression, the
site recognizes the boundary between freedom and abuse, and implements
its content policy accordingly, pursuant to the CDA’s purpose of promoting
self-regulation. 98 The site prohibits bloggers from engaging in copyright
infringement and publishing a third party’s personal and confidential
information. 99 The site also bars its users from misrepresenting themselves
or appropriating another individual’s identity, similar to the appropriation
prong of invasion of privacy. 100 Upon being flagged, Blogger may respond
by deleting the blog, disabling access to the author’s Blogger or Google
account, or in appropriate circumstances report the activity to law
enforcement. 101
¶32
Even though Blogger’s content policies are admirable, the site’s
role as host to JuicyCampus calls into question whether it always enforces
its established standards of appropriate conduct.102 During its year-and-ahalf operation, JuicyCampus administrators openly encouraged salacious
discussion topics, with its motto being “Keep it Juicy.”103 Examples of such
colorful threads included ones that sought the “biggest slut in each sorority”

93

Id at 64.
Id. (quoting Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938)).
95
Blogger.com, The Story of Blogger, http://www.blogger.com/about (last
visited Apr. 3, 2010).
96
Id.
97
Blogger.com, Blogger Features, http://www.blogger.com/features (last visited
Apr. 3, 2010).
98
Blogger.com, Content Policy, http://www.blogger.com/content.g (last visited
Apr. 3, 2010).
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
JuicyCampus’s connection to Blogger is established through its URL
(http://juicycampus.blogspot.com/). The Blogger sites are hosted on Blogspot
and are named accordingly. See Blogger Features, supra note 97.
103
Young, supra note 18.
94
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and the “gayest frat boys,” with the discussions listing those who fit the
labels. 104 Several state attorneys general investigated whether the site had
committed consumer fraud by not adhering to its own guidelines for
removing flagged posts, though site administrators claimed that it did
comply with the established protocol. 105 Despite the complaints, threats of
lawsuits and criminal investigations, the site continued to publish the
“juicy” defamatory threads. 106
¶33
Angry students finally disrupted JuicyCampus’s operations by
flooding the site with nonsense. 107 Students tried to clog the site with
biblical passages, scientific articles, poetry verses, and even complete
novels, causing the site to slow down. 108 Eventually, economic concerns
and the lack of advertisement revenue led to the site’s shutdown in February
2009. 109 The inability of courts and state agencies to sanction or shut down
JuicyCampus due to the difficulty to prove the site’s complicity in
defamatory or fraudulent activities is quite troubling, and showcases the
inherent limitations to government cyber-regulation resulting from the CDA
immunity provision, to the benefit of sites that do not even abide by the
spirit of the CDA to self-regulate.
¶34
Anonymous posting is also employed by reputable sites as a means
of collecting important, potentially sensitive, information about institutions
without fear of repercussions. Vault, for example, is used by job seekers
wishing to benefit from the site’s comprehensive database of company
information, including insider information on salary scales, hiring
procedures and company cultures. 110 Comments by employees are
published anonymously both on the Vault website and in its print
resources. 111 While Vault strives to preserve poster anonymity, the site does
prohibit posting “any content or information that is unlawful, fraudulent,
threatening, abusive, libelous, defamatory, obscene, harassing, misleading,
false or otherwise objectionable, or that infringes on our or any third party's
intellectual property or other proprietary rights.” 112 Furthermore, as the
information disclosed could be sensitive to the health of the company, non-
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Id.
Id.
106
Id.
107
Bell, supra note 19.
108
Id.
109
Young, supra note 18.
110
Vault.com, Mission, http://www.vault.com/ (follow “Mission’ hyperlink)
(last visited Nov. 3, 2009).
111
Vault.com, Review Companies, http://www.vault.com (follow “Companies”
hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 3, 2009).
112
Terms of Use, supra note 16.
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public information should not be posted. 113 If a post is flagged as violating
the aforementioned rules, Vault considers editing or removing the post, or
restricting the poster’s access if necessary. 114
¶35
Yet, Vault advises that, while specificity is required when
discussing an employer, information about the author should not be
sufficiently distinguishing so as to identify the individual. 115 Vault’s privacy
policy provides that the site may collect personally identifiable information,
information that can be used to identify or contact this individual, upon
registering to become a Vault member, purchasing a product on the site,
using the site’s personalized accounts, and participating in other activities
related to the site. 116 Users who do decide to submit employer, profession or
school reviews may be prompted for varied information depending on the
review type, some of which may be personally identifiable.117 However,
credit card information is only collected if the user purchases the premium
products or services solicited on the site. 118 Even credit cards are not always
reliable in identifying the holder because prepaid credit cards can be
purchased in most supermarkets, convenience stores, and pharmacies. 119
Thus, as the “personally identifiable” information is not easily verifiable
and quite simple to fake, the sanctions imposed by Vault are nullified and
the poster can create a new account to regain access.
¶36
The issue of disclosing non-public information is particularly
pertinent when considering sites such as Yahoo! Finance, which provides
accurate and up-to-date information on the health of firms and their
outstanding securities as well as professional analysis and commentary by
market experts on relevant financial topics.120 Typing in a stock quote leads
the user to an individualized page centered on the company. 121 On the
113

Id.
Id.
115
Review Companies, supra note 111.
116
Vault.com, Privacy Policy, http://www.vault.com (follow “Privacy Policy:
Your Privacy Rights” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 3, 2009). Personally
identifiable information may include an individual's name, home address, email
address, telephone number, text message address, email address, credit card
information, age, gender and other demographic information. Id.
117
Id.
118
Vault.Com, Terms of Use, http://www.vault.com/ (follow “Terms of Use”
hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
119
See Ryan Barrett, Privacy through Prepaid Credit Cards, Snarfed.org., Jan.
1, 2003.
120
See Yahoo! Finance Homepage, http://finance.yahoo.com (last visited Nov.
4, 2009).
121
Yahoo! Finance maintains individualized pages for countless firms; the pages
vary in detail depending on the firm’s market presence. To highlight the features
available to users, the author used General Electric as a template. The author
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company page, Yahoo! Finance includes essential investor tools such as a
quote summary, interactive charts allowing the user to interpret the stock
trends, news headlines from reputable news agencies, 122 company
information including a firm profile and links to Securities and Exchange
Commission, and industry and competitor comparisons. 123 Along with the
professionally sponsored firm information, the site also maintains message
boards wherein users may post comments about the firm. 124
¶37
In a disclaimer, Yahoo! reminds site visitors that the message board
is not affiliated with the company it concerns, and the messages posted
thereon are solely the opinions of the users and cannot adequately substitute
independent research, and should not be relied upon for the purpose of
making investment decisions. 125 Yahoo! is adamant that users may not
violate any laws through the site, including regulations set forth by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, and such a violation may result in
disclosure of account information if compelled by law to do so.126 However,
while the finance message boards warn that posters “never assume that
[they] are anonymous and cannot be identified by [their] posts,” 127 it is not
unimaginable that clever posters could frame their comments in such
indistinguishable fashions as to remove any identifiable characteristics.
Indeed, in order to become a Yahoo! member and thus qualify to post, a
user need only provide a name, gender, birthday, country of origin, postal
code, and email address. 128 Such details are not easily verifiable, calling into
question the value of the site’s promise to release account information if
compelled to by law.
¶38
Yahoo! Finance provides a link to a page wherein the SEC
succinctly explains the predicament faced by Internet investor sites.

typed “GE” into the “Get Quote” text box on the Homepage, infra note 196, and
was redirected to the Yahoo Finance page for General Electric.
http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=GE (last visited Nov. 4, 2009) [hereinafter
General Electric Page].
122
The articles on Yahoo! Finance about General Electric originated from the
Associated Press, Reuters, the Wall Street Journal, Barrons, Fox Business, and
CNBC. Headlines for General Electric Company,
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/h?s=GE (last visited Nov. 4, 2009).
123
General Electric Page, supra note 121.
124
Yahoo Finance, General Electric Message Board,
http://messages.finance.yahoo.com/mb/GE (last visited Nov. 4, 2009).
125
Id
126
Yahoo.com, Terms of Service,
http://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/utos-173.html (last visited Nov. 4,
2009).
127
Yahoo! Finance, General Electric Message Board, supra note 124.
128
Yahoo.com, Yahoo Registration, http://m.www.yahoo.com (follow “New
here? sign up” link) (last visited Nov. 4, 2009).
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Specifically, the agency advises Internet-reliant investors that finance
bulletin boards are popular with fraudsters who overly promote certain
firms, often by pretending to disclose “inside” information.129 Alternatively,
posters purporting to be unbiased investors who have merely conducted
extensive research may actually be company insiders, large shareholders, or
hired promoters. 130 In either event, it is difficult to know with whom one is
dealing on those boards as they allow users to conceal their identity behind
multiple aliases.131 The prospect of a single poster utilizing multiple
usernames is especially frightening as this can create an illusion of
widespread interest in a little-known or otherwise undeserving firm or
security. 132
¶39
The issue of electronically disclosing material nonpublic
information or fraudulent information in connection with investments in
securities implicates SEC Rule 10b-5. 133 Rule 10b-5 provides that it is
unlawful “to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.” 134 The
SEC has used Rule 10b-5 to challenge corporate mismanagement,
fraudulent liquidations, corporate misstatements and failures to disclose,
unacceptable mergers, and insider trading. 135 The multitude of legal
consequences, both civil and criminal, due to fraudulent disclosure and
insider trading would presumably hold the bulletin board users accountable
for their posts. Yet, securities officials and plaintiffs wronged by fraudulent
investor advice cannot seek appropriate remedies if they are unable to
identify the defendants.

129

Securities and Exchange Commission, Internet Fraud: How to Avoid Internet
Investment Scams, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/cyberfraud.htm (last
visited Nov. 5, 2009). A “pump-and-dump” scam is orchestrated by promoters
who stand to profit by selling their shares after the stock price is pumped up by
gullible investors. Id. This scam is typically associated with smaller companies
because there is little or no public information available about the firm. Id.
130
Id.
131
See id.
132
See Internet Fraud, supra note 129.
133
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008).
134
Id. It would be illegal “[to] employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud” or “[to] engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.” Id.
135
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.3[3] (6th
ed. 2009) (explaining the circumstances in which Rule 10b-5 is used to seek
civil remedies).
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¶40
On October 3, 2008, an anonymous poster claimed on CNN’s
iReport.com 136 that Apple, Inc., CEO Steve Jobs had suffered a heart
attack. 137 Though Apple denied the story, the company’s stock price
plummeted roughly 3 percent.138 Eventually, the SEC identified the culprit
as an 18-year-old who exhibited no apparent profit motivation from the
market manipulation.139 Regardless of this poster’s intent, the disastrous
consequences of posting false rumors seen here demonstrate the necessity
for efficient accountability of all Internet stories that could have a material
effect on the market, which is not possible if a user must only provide an
email address to contribute even to a legitimate news site such as CNN.

Even if the individual user can supply a false name and email
address when registering to post on an Internet bulletin board, presumably
one could still be traced through the Internet Protocol (IP) address. 140
Tracing IP addresses is an established method utilized by law enforcement
to identify and locate suspects in Internet-related crimes. 141 Yet, the danger
of having one’s IP address tracked by predators creates a demand for
software with which users may disguise their IP addresses while browsing
the Internet. For example, criminals employing spyware or malware
software can see private chat sessions, intercept email communications, and
log Web sites visit in order to acquire personal information. 142 Indeed,
according to Anonymizer, 1.5 million Americans become victims of
identity theft each year.143 Anonymizer assures anonymous surfing by
providing consumers with rotating anonymous IP addresses.144 In doing so,
¶41

136

http://www.ireport.com/.
Greg Sandoval, SEC Launches Probe into Phony Jobs Heart Attack Report,
CNET NEWS, Oct. 3, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-1005800893.html (last visited Dec. 24, 2009).
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
An IP address is an exclusive number all information technology devices
(printers, routers, modems, etc.) use which allows them to communicate with
each other on a computer network. What Is My IP,
http://www.whatismyip.com/faq/what-is-an-ip-address.asp/ (last visited Nov. 5,
2009). IP addresses may either be assigned permanently, for an Email server, a
business server or a home resident, or temporarily, from a pool of addresses
(first come first serve) from your Internet Service Provider. Id.
141
See, e.g., Denise Dubie, DNS Plays Role in Craigslist Killer Case, NETWORK
WORLD, Apr. 23, 2009, http://www.networkworld.com/news/2009/042309craigslist-dns.html (explaining how network technology played a role in
catching the killer and predicting that IP data identifying and locating criminals
will expand its presence in the criminal investigation process).
142
Anonymizer.com, Homepage, http://www.anonymizer.com (last visited Nov.
5, 2009).
143
Id.
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Id.
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Anonymizer strives to protect Internet users from invasion of privacy by
intrusion or misappropriation. Anonymizer is not alone in its efforts to
conceal Internet users’ identity, as Tor145 and the I2P Anonymous
Network 146 provide similar services.
Yet, while Anonymizer’s intent is noble, there is also the
undeniable potential for abuse of an anonymous identity. Anonymizer
prohibits users from utilizing its services to “invade the privacy of others”
or “do anything illegal.” 147 The company asserts its right to monitor use of
the anonymous service as well as its prerogative to disclose
communications in order to ensure compliance with the user agreement. 148
However, the site does not specify that it always monitors
communications. 149 While the site uses filtering technology to intercept
bulk emails and commercial emails, it is not clear that similar measures are
in place to counter personal attacks on individuals’ privacy.150 Furthermore,
as messages are sent anonymously, the recipient cannot report inappropriate
behavior to the company, thereby denying it the chance to take the
necessary measures.
¶42

V. THE COURTS’ UNWILLINGNESS TO SHUT DOWN SITES
ACCUSED OF OR COMPLICIT IN INVASION OF PRIVACY
¶43
The cases discussed supra demonstrate that courts continue to defer
to the Internet companies’ efforts to self-regulate as the firms contribute
positively to the Internet’s productivity. Many of the defendants in webcentered invasion of privacy and defamation litigation are widely used
websites that contribute positively to society. For example, America
Online—the corporation at issue in the 1997 Zeran case—was a leading

145

Tor Anonymity Online, http://www.torproject.org (last visited Nov. 6, 2009).
Tor is a network of virtual tunnels that allows people to improve their privacy
and security on the Internet. Tor Overview,
http://www.torproject.org/overview.html.en#overview (last visited Nov. 6,
2009).
146
I2P Anonomous Network, Homepage, http://www.i2p2.de (last visited Nov.
6, 2009). “I2P is an anonymizing network, offering a simple layer that identitysensitive applications can use to securely communicate. All data is wrapped with
several layers of encryption, and the network is both distributed and dynamic,
with no trusted parties.” Id.
147
Anonymizer.com, Terms of Use,
http://www.anonymizer.com/company/legal/terms_of_use.html (last visited
Nov. 5, 2009).
148
Id.
149
See id.
150
See id.
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Internet service provider, at one point boasting 30 million subscribers.151
Google is a multiservice Internet conglomerate that provides users with a
powerful search engine, email and instant messaging, office productivity
functions, video sharing, and social networking. 152 Amazon, featured in the
Almeida case, 153 is a web-based shopping venue, featuring everything from
books to jewelry to home improvement supplies. 154 AdultFriendFinder, an
adult matching and dating website, facilitates inter-personal relationships,
albeit focusing on a concentrated audience.
¶44
Even sites that promote anonymous posting exhibit purposes that
benefit society as a whole. Anonymizer provides its anonymity software in
order to protect users from spyware and other means of tracking Internet
movement and identity theft.155 Vault, meanwhile, promotes open and
honest discussion on institutions and industries so that students and
professionals alike may formulate informed career decisions. 156 Yahoo!
Finance encourages the dissemination of financial information among
relatively amateur investors to supplement the professional commentaries in
order to gauge the health of their investments.157
¶45
The aforementioned sites and their anonymity components provide
ample opportunity for users to engage in egregious invasions of privacy.
However, as the sites reserve the right to monitor for and remove
inappropriate content, they satisfy the CDA “Good Samaritan” provision
and thus are exempt from civil liability. 158 Furthermore, while “John Doe”
subpoenas could be served on Yahoo! and Vault to produce the poster’s
personal information, it is quite possible that the individual provided
fraudulent information. An IP address would be a more precise method of
ascertaining information about the poster. However, anonymous proxy
software provided by Anonymizer, Tor, or I2P disguises the IP address
from investigators. Alternatively, the plaintiff could direct the “John Doe”
subpoenas at the anonymous software provider. In fact, these sites could be
concentrated treasure troves of information on anonymous posters, sought
by private and government parties alike. However, these sites could be
capable of hiding the user’s identity if they employed a technique akin to
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Catherine Holahan, Will Less Be More for AOL?, BUS. WK., July 31, 2006,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jul2006/tc20060731_168094.
htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2009).
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See Google Homepage, http://www.google.com/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2009).
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See generally Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2006).
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See Amazon Homepage, http://www.amazon.com/ (last visited Nov. 6,
2009).
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See Anonymizer Homepage, supra note 142.
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See Vault.com, Mission, supra note 110.
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See General Electric Page, supra note 121.
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See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006).
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spread spectrum technology, and scattered the information across the
Internet. 159
¶46
When the plaintiff’s injury originated with an Internet user
employing anonymity software, the plaintiff could subpoena the personal
information from the Anonymizer site. Yet, all Internet users, even the
defendant, have an expectation of privacy. In addition to information
collected upon purchasing products, Anonymizer gathers information on
site visitors including IP addresses, browser type and language, and the date
of visit. 160 Aside from consensual disclosure, Anonymizer releases usage
information if disclosure is “reasonably necessary to satisfy any applicable
law, regulation, legal process or enforceable governmental request,” or to
“protect against imminent harm to the rights, property or safety of
Anonymizer, [its] customers or the public.” 161 The “imminent harm”
requirement for voluntary release could be problematic, as the site is
responsible for determining what is imminent. Furthermore, specifying
“imminence” would not likely give the proper authorities ample opportunity
to mount an appropriate response. In the context of self-defense, courts have
limited “imminence” to “‘reasonably probable,’ not merely possible,” 162 and
refer to a “‘present’” threat as opposed to a future one. 163 Thus, while
striving to preserve its users’ privacy, Anonymizer only presents
opportunities for subsequent remedial measures, while limiting the window
for preventative ones.
¶47
The “reasonably necessary” standard undoubtedly includes
responding affirmatively to “John Doe” subpoenas, and is consistent with a
recent ruling by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
in which the court articulated a five-step test to be applied when presented
with a motion to quash or enforce such a subpoena.164 The court should first
ensure that the plaintiff has “adequately pleaded the elements of the
159

Spread spectrum is “wireless communications technology that scatters data
transmissions . . . in a pseudorandom pattern. Spreading the data across the
frequency spectrum greatly increases the bandwidth, and it also makes the signal
resistant to noise, interference, and snooping.” CNET Reviews, CNET Glossary:
Spread Spectrum, http://reviews.cnet.com/4520-6029_7-5958697-1.html/ (last
visited April 13, 2010).
160
Anonymizer.com, Privacy Policy,
http://www.anonymizer.com/company/legal/privacy_policy.html (last visited
Nov. 6, 2009). Anonymizer is the most commercial of the three anonymity
services I have identified, and sets forth the most thorough policy.
161
Id.
162
People v. Robinson, 872 N.E.2d 1061, 1076 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (quoting
State v. Payne, 7 S.W.3d 25, 28 (Tenn. 1999)).
163
Robinson, 872 N.E.2d at 1076 (quoting Kessler v. State, 850 S.W.2d 217, 222
(Tex. App. 1993)).
164
See Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 954 (D.C. 2009).
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claim.” 165 Then, the court should demand reasonable efforts on the part of
the Internet firm “to notify the anonymous defendant that the complaint has
been filed and the subpoena has been served,” and possibly “delay further
action for a reasonable time to allow the defendant an opportunity to file a
motion to quash” the subpoena. 166 The plaintiff must present evidence
“creating a genuine issue of material fact on each element of the claim that
is within its control,” or all elements not dependent on knowing the
defendant’s identity. 167 In evaluating this evidence, the court should
determine whether the information sought is vital to enable the plaintiff to
proceed with the lawsuit. 168 This test provides insight into the steep
threshold that private and government plaintiffs must overcome to gain
access to information that users shared with the utmost expectation of
privacy. The consistency between this court’s standard for enforcing “John
Doe” subpoenas and Anonymizer’s own protocols reinforces the inference
that a court would comply with the CDA and defer accordingly to its selfregulatory policy.
Indeed, the Internet’s global scope creates situations in which
anonymity is necessary to avoid undue risk and possible bodily harm to
users. Regimes that rigidly limit the free dissemination of information often
seek user information from Internet companies, and those firms that rely on
continued service in that country comply to ensure future business.169 For
example, Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! have faced scrutiny for helping
China monitor and censor content.170 Yahoo! was even accused of exposing
a Chinese journalist who sent a summary of Communist Party
communications to a foreign website via Yahoo!’s email service.171 The
danger faced by Internet users in various countries necessitates the existence
of “anonymizing” software, and would justify barring any civil actions
brought against the vendors in American court under section 230 of the
CDA.
¶48

¶49
American courts have in the past supported actions to shut down
Internet companies that come under fire and are not shown to serve a
“legitimate” purpose. The Napster case172 is one example of this judicial
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Id.
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Id. at 954-55.
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Id. at 954.
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Joseph Kahn, Yahoo Helped Chinese to Prosecute Journalist, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 8, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/07/business/worldbusiness/07iht-yahoo.html.
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Id.
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See generally A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001).
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selective Darwinism. Napster facilitated file-sharing of MP3 audio files,
allowing users to search the MP3 music files stored on other users’
computers and transfer copies of the contents of other users’ MP3 files from
one computer to another. 173 The recording company plaintiffs alleged that
Napster users engaged in the wholesale reproduction and distribution of
copyrighted works, all constituting direct infringement of copyright law,174
and that Napster facilitated the infringements.175 Although Napster
contended that the users’ actions constituted fair use of the material,176 the
Ninth Circuit could not find a valid fair use defense available to users. 177
Furthermore, the plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success with
regards to the contributory copyright infringement claim. 178 The court also
dismissed Napster’s proposed compulsory royalty as an “easy out” for the
embattled company, and reasoned that the imposition of such a device
would destroy the plaintiffs' ability to control their intellectual property. 179
The injunction issued by the District Court remained in place and Napster
was prohibited from conducting its business. 180
However, judicial action has not been shown to provide absolute
solutions when confronting legal issues in cyberspace. Even though the
court enjoined Napster from hosting its file-sharing operations and
infringing copyright law, new sites have emerged since Napster, engage in
similar activities, and still persist. For instance, BitTorrent is an Internetbased protocol allowing users to download files quickly by uploading parts
of them at the same time. 181 While this program does have a strict copyright
policy, 182 the fragmented nature of the file sharing would complicate an
infringement complaint. The justice system’s inability to act decisively was
evident in the JuicyCampus case, where state officials were so unacceptably
slow at demonstrating the raucous site’s violations of the CDA that students
were forced to shut down the site by essentially spamming the site.183
¶50

173

Id. at 1011.
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), 106(3) (2006).
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Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011.
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Id. at 1014.
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Id. at 1019.
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See id. at 1029.
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BitTorrent.com, What is BitTorrent?,
http://www.bittorrent.com/btusers/what-is-bittorrent (last visited Nov. 6, 2009).
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BitTorrent.com, Copyright Policy,
http://www.bittorrent.com/legal/copyright-policy (last visited Nov. 6, 2009)
(“BitTorrent does not permit copyright infringing activities on its websites and
will, if properly notified that files infringe a copyright, remove or disable access
to such files.”).
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¶51
If reputable websites with ample public support are immune from
liability pursuant to the CDA, the correct method of assigning liability may
lie with targeting the individual user. To ensure that a potential defendant’s
privacy is protected, a burden of reasonable certainty of misuse, reasonable
harm, and time elapsed since the initial reporting should be the threshold
showing to retrieve personal information for service. That is, a plaintiff
should show that a reasonable person would conclude that the defendant
misused the Internet service to perpetrate the tort. Also, a plaintiff should
demonstrate a reasonable person would be harmed or offended by the
conduct. The time variable gives the companies ample time to self-regulate
before involving an outside body. This triple-pronged test resembles the
Solers test, 184 and implicates the spirit of the CDA to encourage selfregulation, while offering injured plaintiffs a judicial option if private
efforts fail.

VI. THE SOLUTION: VERIFICATION FOR ALL USERS
¶52
If the courts are not going to hold websites accountable for the
damaging posts of anonymous users, and judicial focus shifts onto the
posters, then one possible solution would be to have the posters
confidentially lodge and verify their identity with an authentication service.
This would hold users accountable for their posts and would present
opportunity for service by plaintiffs. The verification system should be
similar to the model employed by VeriSign. VeriSign, Inc. is a leading
provider of digital trust services that enable Web site owners, enterprises,
communications service providers, electronic commerce, and individuals to
engage in secure digital commerce and communications.185 The company’s
identity and authentication services provide web-based companies with
secure fraud detection and authentication for protecting the online identities
of consumers, business partners, and employees. 186 The Secure Sockets
Layer (SSL) certification services enable secure commerce,
communications, and interactions by providing encryption and
authentication services to Web sites, intranets, and extranets. 187
¶53
All sites that allow posters to publish comments anonymously
should require that users register with an independent identity verification
service, so that the actions associated with the assigned anonymous identity
184

See Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 954-55 (D.C. 2009).
Fundinguniverse.com, VeriSign, Inc. Company History,
http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/VeriSign-Inc-CompanyHistory.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2009).
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Verisign.com, Company Information,
http://www.verisign.com/corporate/information/index.html (last visited Nov. 6,
2009).
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may be tracked and traced back to the individual. This program would be
just as secure as Anonymizer and facilitate an informed expectation of
privacy. Many Internet users are not aware that their activities online can be
tracked by their IP address.188 However, upon registering for an anonymous
identity, the verification program would advise users of the appropriate
expectation of privacy under this new regime. Specifically, a disclaimer
would inform users that, while harmless web browsing would not trigger
disclosure, actions violating the law could lead to their identity being
uncovering and released to the proper authorities.
¶54
In order to register for an anonymous identity, the service should
require a valid name, address, birthday as verification for age-sensitive
sites, driver’s license number (or equivalent thereof), and city of birth.
Furthermore, users should have the option to enter credit card information at
this point to use this system for universal payments, similar to PayPal. The
credit card information should be used or released solely for the purpose of
facilitating purchases. However, the card may not be prepaid. Though a
valid social security number is the most accurate form of identification, the
consequences of losing such data should be quite disastrous for the user.
There should understandably be trepidation concerning sharing such
sensitive information over the Internet. However, any data provided should
be encrypted and presumably safe from hackers trying to procure the private
information. This security is consistent with the ECPA’s purpose of
protecting electronically stored communications.189
¶55
The proposed identity verification system should be independently
run. It should not be a government entity since the global nature of the
Internet should pose problematic jurisdictional questions over which
governmental body should be responsible for management, maintenance
and security. Furthermore, an Internet poster interested in anonymity is
likely seeking to avoid government attention, and should be reluctant to
input personal information into a government database. The verification
program should also be independent of the websites requiring registration,

188

See Kelly Martin, Privacy and Anonymity, SECURITYFOCUS, Feb. 14, 2006,
http://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/386 (explaining that while “only
about a third of the public even knows what spyware is; . . . as broadband
connections have become inexpensive and pervasive, we are increasingly being
tracked by our IP addresses at home. If you have high speed Internet at home,
odds are your IP address is relatively static now - cable and DSL modems are
often assigned the same IP address for up to a year. Website owners can track
your repeat visits much more easily - what time you arrived, how long you
stayed, and how often you come back.”).
189
See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2006) (asserting that it is illegal to obtain, alter, or
otherwise interfere with authorized access to a wire or electronic communication
while it is in electronic storage).
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so that these websites should not be hampered or burdened by additional
self-regulation. The sites’ regulatory efforts should be solely focused on
ensuring that they delete content flagged as an invasion of privacy or
defamatory. This initiative also supports the spirit of the CDA and its
interest of promoting Internet usage as users should feel more secure in their
posts, and the sites should be free to allocate their resources towards further
progress and innovation.
¶56
Although the websites should not be responsible for collecting user
data, they should have easy access to it. In a civil suit, the plaintiff should
serve the website with a “John Doe” subpoena, assuming the threshold
derived in Part V could be met. The site should comply with the subpoena,
and provide the necessary information. The easily accessible data saves all
parties from the costs of suing the website directly, especially if the court
should ultimately going to dismiss the claim as a result of CDA immunity.
The websites should have no reason to access the verification information
unless served with a valid subpoena. Rather, a given website should only
record the anonymous identity assigned to that user. Thus, the user should
not have to procure anonymous proxy software from Anonymizer, Tor, or
the I2P Anonymous Network. Transaction costs are minimized both in
setting up multiple Internet accounts and in tracking down and contacting
the proxy service.
¶57
Though this subpoena structure is intended for use in private
actions, government investigators should presumably procure Internet user
information in the same fashion. While this identity-verification project
should not be government-controlled, it should be initiated through
legislative mandate and subject to rigorous regulatory oversight.
¶58
Identity verification as described in this iBrief should only apply
within the United States, to American Internet domains. As demonstrated
above, it is quite possible that global anonymous proxies that disguise IP
numbers serve a legitimate and necessary purpose in countries with strict
Internet content restrictions in place. Indeed, it is impossible at this stage to
consider how this proposed identity-verification software should be adopted
in countries where strict censorship regimes hinder the free dissemination of
information, and where state officials should closely monitor the identities
and movements of Internet users.

CONCLUSION
Anonymous posting on Internet websites and the rampant invasions
of privacy committed by unconcerned Internet users is alarming. Yet, in
trying to identify the parties, the plaintiff must face the formidable task of
overcoming CDA immunity. At the same time, courts and politicians must
consider the defendant’s expectation of privacy in posting anonymously
¶59
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online. The heightened standard for procuring subpoenas described here
seeks to serve as a compromise for the conflicting privacy interests.
However, the most effective way, both from an economic and a legal
standpoint, to manage Internet anonymity would be to develop a
centralized, independent identity-verification system. This model would
instill greater consumer confidence in the Internet, and would abide by the
spirit of the CDA and promote the continued growth of the World Wide
Web into the future.

